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Abstract
Intelligent technologies have the potential to transform organizations and organizing 
processes. In particular, they are unique from prior organizational technologies in that 
they reposition technology as agent rather than a tool or object of use. Scholars study-
ing human-machine communication (HMC) have begun to theorize the dual role played 
by human and machine agency, but they have focused primarily on the individual level. 
Drawing on Structuration Theory (Giddens, 1984), we propose a theoretical framework to 
explain agency in HMC as a process involving the negotiation of control between human 
and machine agents. This article contributes to HMC scholarship by offering a framework 
and research agenda to guide future theory-building and research on the use of intelligent 
technologies in organizational contexts.
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Introduction
Intelligent technologies, a class of emerging technologies fueled by artificial intelligence 
(AI), have great potential to transform organizations and organizing processes (Bailey & 
Barley, 2020). Such technologies, including machine learning, robotics, and smart sensors, 
are programmed to mimic human capacity to learn from various inputs (i.e., new data and 
pattern recognition) and to respond to stimuli modeling human responses (West & Allen, 
2018). From intelligent personal assistants, such as Siri and Alexa, to algorithmic systems 
such as Uber’s ridesharing application, AI is increasingly ubiquitous across industries with 
the potential to generate annual global value of over $5 trillion (Chui & Malhotra, 2018). 
The use of intelligent technologies in organizations is also growing, and whether embodied 
in a device or running in the background as algorithms, they are taking on increasingly 
agentic roles. For instance, in 2016 the Finnish company Tieto appointed an AI agent, Ali-
cia T., as a member of the leadership team of one of its business units (Diktonius, 2016). 
Similarly, IBM’s Watson Talent aids and plays several critical roles for both employees and 
employers in human resource processes (IBM Watson Talent, 2021). In these cases, intel-
ligent technologies differ from prior information and communication technologies (ICTs) 
in that they have the potential to take on a more active role and work collaboratively with 
humans (Chui & Malhotra, 2018).
Prior research on technology-mediated work (e.g., Raghuram et al., 2019) has primar-
ily conceptualized technology as object or tool of use; however, the growing use of AI for 
decision-making and other collaborative functions repositions technology as agent through 
the notion that it can serve as a social agent (Banks & de Graaf, 2020; Gunkel, 2012; Guzman, 
2020). This notion is not new, but dates back to the Computers as Social Actors paradigm 
(CASA) (Gambino et al., 2020; Reeves & Nass, 1996), which posits that humans can treat 
machines with social potential as social actors, respond to them emotionally, and identify 
with them as teammates or colleagues. While the CASA paradigm is well poised to explain 
individual level interactions with computers (Gaudiello et al., 2016; Sparrow et al., 2011; 
Waytz et al., 2014), it offers limited insights into processes of human-machine communi-
cation (HMC) at the group or organizational level. Intelligent technologies challenge our 
notions of communication to balance both anthropocentric but technocentric perspectives 
on agency (Banks & de Graaf, 2020) as well as raising concerns about algorithmic control, a 
new form of rational control that is facilitated by algorithmic systems (Kellogg et al., 2020). 
To better theorize these shifts, we draw on Structuration Theory (ST; Giddens, 1984) to 
develop a theoretical framework that helps to explain the relationship between human and 
machine agency as well as how both are implicated in a dialectic of control. Our goal here is 
not to offer specific propositions or testable hypotheses, but rather to leverage ST as a sensi-
tizing device to help researchers theorize issues of agency, structure, and control in human 
and machine relationships (Pozzebon & Pinsonneault, 2005). Through the discussion of 
related concepts and illustrative examples, this paper contributes to HMC scholarship by 
offering a theoretical framework and research agenda to guide future theory-building and 
research on the use of intelligent technologies in organizational contexts. We also extend 
ST by extending the notion of agency to encompass both human and machine agency in a 
dialectic of control. 
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Structuration Theory: The Duality of Structure
An essential question for scholars studying how humans interact with increasingly intelli-
gent technologies is what their relationship might look like. Inevitably, scholars have turned 
toward concepts such as agency and control to understand HMC. For instance, recent work 
shows the necessity to carefully consider the amount of agency that intelligent technologies 
have in relation to their human collaborators as machines become increasingly perceived 
as having agency (Fraune, 2020; Guzman & Lewis, 2020). As Banks & de Graaf (2020) point 
out, we should think about “human and machine roles in communication processes in a 
more egalitarian fashion” (p. 19) where the agency, interactivity, and mutual influence of 
both humans and machines are taken into account. An emerging recognition is that HMC 
is relational in nature and is constituted in interactions between humans and machines 
(Guzman, 2018; Suchman, 2007). For instance, Suchman takes a critical anthropological 
perspective on human-machine interaction, arguing that the boundaries between humans 
and machines are discursively and materially enacted, and that as such they can be recon-
figured through an interactive process. However, aside from a few notable exceptions, such 
as the field of automated journalism (Lewis et al., 2019), the notion of HMC as an organiza-
tional process has not yet been adequately theorized. Indeed, the lack of attention to HMC 
within the field of organizational communication is evident in the fact that over the past 
5 years (2016–2020), only two (less than 1%) of the 204 paper sessions sponsored by the 
Organizational Communication Divisions of both the National Communication Associa-
tion and the International Communication Association were related to intelligent technol-
ogies or artificial intelligence. 
This motivates us to draw on structuration theory to explain the process through which 
agency and control are negotiated in HMC. At its theoretical roots, ST (Giddens, 1979; 
1984) explains the structure-agency debate that constitutes a central theme in social the-
ory broadly and in communication theory more specifically (Banks & Riley, 1993; Riley, 
1983). According to Giddens (1984), structure and agency are recursively related in that 
humans create rules and resources—or structures—that in turn enable and constrain their 
actions and behavior. Agents and structures are not independent but are mutually consti-
tuted through the duality of structure, as “the structural properties of social systems are 
both medium and outcome of the practices they recursively organize” (Giddens, 1984, 
p. 25). In this perspective, social actors both draw upon and reproduce structural features 
of wider social systems in their day-to-day activities. Although structure is more enduring, 
the social systems in which it is instantiated are comprised of situated activities of human 
agents that are reproduced across time and space. While human agents have the ability to 
act knowledgeably and reflexively, the activities that lead to reproduction of social and insti-
tutionalized practices often have unintended consequences; this helps to explain both how 
social systems endure as well as how they change and evolve.
While ST has traditionally focused on social systems and structures, organizational 
scholars have drawn attention to technological systems and structures as well. Previous 
research on the structuring role of technology in organizations has highlighted the ways 
people make sense of, appropriate, and develop practices around technology (Leon-
ardi, 2011; Majchrzak et al., 2000). Scholars have applied ST to understand the recursive 
relationship between human agency and sociotechnological structures (Barley, 1986; 
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DeSanctis & Poole, 1994; Orlikowski & Yates, 1994; Stillman & Stoecker, 2005). For exam-
ple, Barley’s (1986) account of the implementation of computerized tomography (CT) 
scanners at two hospitals illustrated that adoption of the new CT machines not only restruc-
tured the work practices of the radiologists and CT technologists, but also disrupted and 
redefined occupational roles and power relationships between these two groups of experts. 
Orlikowski and Yates (1994) found that knowledge workers developed rules around email 
use by drawing on established genres and genre repertoires that served to structure their 
communicative practices, which were rich and varied and changed over time. DeSanctis 
and Poole developed Adaptive Structuration Theory (AST) to explain how group members 
appropriate the structures provided by technology, often in combination with other social 
and organizational structures, in ways that may be either faithful to or at odds with the ini-
tial intent of the designers. This line of research helps to explain the recursive relationship 
between organizing and technology, and the way in which this process evolves over time. 
However, it treats agency as confined to human actors and structure as confined to tech-
nology (which is regarded as object rather than actor). Intelligent technologies require an 
extension of structurational theory to account for both human and machine agency and the 
ways they are instantiated and negotiated in HMC.
A Structurational View of Human-Machine Communication 
Traditionally, humans are the only type of organizational actor that meets the criteria for 
agency in ST (Giddens, 1979; McPhee et al., 2014). According to ST, agency stems from 
one’s capacity to exercise power in meaningful or normative ways and to reflexively monitor 
one’s actions, which allows them to understand how their actions either reify or transform 
the structures in which they act (Giddens, 1984). The rapid advancement of intelligent tech-
nologies brings about the need to expand ST by contending with both human and machine 
agency.
Human Agency and Machine Agency
Communication scholars and social theorists more broadly have defined agency as a capac-
ity or ability that originates from the resources, rights, and obligations that an individual 
social actor owns and occupies (Abdelnour et al., 2017; DeSanctis & Poole, 1994; Giddens, 
1979). As Emirbayer and Mische (1998) pointed out, an agent should be able to develop 
habits from past experience, make judgments about their present environment, and imag-
ine their future actions, which they refer to as the “Chordal Triad.” Giddens defines agency 
as the ability to make a difference, or the “ability to do otherwise” (Giddens, 1984). While it 
is important to recognize the agentic capacity of intelligent technologies, our focus here is 
not to redefine agency. Thus, in this paper, we follow previous discussions and define agency 
colloquially as one’s capacity to reflect, adapt, and act. 
The idea of technology and material artifacts having agency is not new. Scholars study-
ing the relationship between humans and technology have increasingly recognized that 
physical objects can also have agency as we inscribe behaviors into them and give them the 
capacity to mediate our interactions (Latour, 1991) and as we interact with physical objects 
and technologies through various work arrangements in organizations (Orlikowski, 2007; 
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Orlikowski & Scott, 2008). In this way, social and material agencies are mutually imbricated 
(Leonardi, 2011). More importantly, recent theorizing about digital agency of AI (Ågerfalk, 
2020) and symbiotic agency in chatbots (Neff & Nagy, 2016) has begun to recognize that 
intelligent technologies themselves have increasingly more agency as a result of our pro-
gramming and design. A distinctive feature of intelligent technologies is their ability to 
perform tasks autonomously, taking over control of organizational tasks such as schedul-
ing meetings, screening job candidates, or even making recommendations for social rela-
tionship development (Perc et al., 2019; Russell & Norvig, 2019). Technologies such as, for 
example, Google’s page ranking algorithm, have the capacity to act symbolically (i.e., pro-
vide recommendations and rank search results) on behalf of the individuals and organiza-
tions who developed them. Essentially, machine agency refers to the capacity of intelligent 
technologies to perform specific tasks given its material features. Similar recognition that 
machines might differ in their levels of agency can also be found in early work on sys-
tems theory (Boulding, 1956; Pondy & Mitroff, 1979). Systems may vary in levels of agency 
from reactive systems (which respond to environmental cues in predetermined ways) to 
goal-driven systems (which incorporate goals set by others) and problem-solving systems 
(which are more complex as they are capable of solving problems in achieving their goals 
and adjusting goals and routines). At even higher levels of agency are self-aware systems 
(which are aware of themselves and other agents and can reflect on their own activity) and 
multivocal systems (composed of multiple selves, can orient differently to different parts of 
the situation, and may reconstitute themselves through problem-solving and reflection). 
These levels of agency can be applied to various AI tools and systems. Therefore, AI may 
differ in terms of how responsive it is to external and internal cues, its freedom of action and 
reflexivity to monitor action, its decision-making ability, and its awareness of other agents 
and of its own agency.
Knowledgeability. Giddens identified two criteria for agency. The first is knowledgeability, 
the tacit information or discursive resources that actors have about the circumstances that 
can inform their future actions. In Giddens’s (1984) words, knowledgeability is about “what 
agents know about what they do, and why they do it” (p. xxiii). Taking comprehensive data 
processing as an example, intelligent technologies that have the ability to collect a vari-
ety of data on employees including biometrics, messages between users, and the location 
of workers can be considered as knowledgeable about their collaborators in organizations 
(Kellogg et al., 2020). For example, Duhigg (2012) reported on a case where the retail cor-
poration Target used machine learning and pattern recognition of consumer purchase data 
(including changes in buying behavior of body lotions and cleaning products) to predict 
pregnancy in its female shoppers—sometimes even before they or their families knew they 
were pregnant. The AI technology that Target used in this case developed predictions based 
on the information that it had about its customers. It acted knowledgeably as a tool for orga-
nizations. In the rideshare context, Uber’s AI can leverage multiple data points to manage 
employees including customer ratings, geographic location, how cooperative drivers are 
with accepting assignments, and how long rides take (Lee et al., 2017; Rosenblat & Stark, 
2016). In contrast to the Target example, AI in this case acted in a managerial capacity 
through directing and facilitating interactions between Uber employees and their custom-
ers. Chan and Humphreys (2018) demonstrated that the data collected on Uber drivers 
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allows AI technologies to surveil its contracted workforce on behalf of the organization 
by tracking spatial movements and customer interactions. These examples illustrate that 
current intelligent technologies know what they should do, even though they do not yet 
know why.
When developing ST, Giddens (1984) recognized that the knowledgeability of human 
actors will always be limited in some ways and we argue that this is also true of intelli-
gent technologies. Levels of awareness are likely to vary between three different types of 
consciousness that inform actor knowledgeability: discursive consciousness, practical con-
sciousness, and unconsciousness. Discursive consciousness refers to an actor’s ability to 
understand the purpose of their actions and explain those reasons in social interactions. In 
contrast to discursive consciousness, practical consciousness consists of an actor’s ability to 
recognize how a task needs to be completed and competently act, and is more habituated 
or routinized and taken for granted. Lastly, Giddens (1984) acknowledged that actors often 
are unconscious or unaware of (a) conditions that shape actions and (b) unintended con-
sequences of actions within larger structures. Ultimately, agency in ST is less focused on 
the intentions and goals of actors and instead emphasizes the patterned actions of agents 
(Giddens, 1979; 1984). Giddens (1984) argued that “knowledgeability is founded less upon 
discursive than practical consciousness” (p. 25). Although intelligent technologies are not 
aware of the reasons behind their actions and cannot exercise discursive consciousness, 
they are capable of enacting more routinized practical consciousness that directs actions in 
a larger structure. We argue that the lack of discursive consciousness in intelligent technol-
ogies does not prohibit ST from being applied in HMC. Rather, distinguishing which types 
of consciousness inform knowledgeability in intelligent technologies contributes to our 
understanding of machine agency and how machines may complement or hinder human 
agency in organizations. 
Reflexive monitoring. The second criterion of agency is reflexive monitoring. This refers 
to the ability to monitor one’s actions, evaluate the outcomes of these actions, and develop 
awareness of the settings and contexts around the actions (Giddens, 1984). A good example 
of reflexive monitoring in intelligent technologies is instantaneous processing. This refers 
to the high velocity of algorithmic computation and the ability to incorporate performance 
systems in real time (Kellogg et al., 2020). Examples of instantaneous processing include 
AI-enabled technologies such as Robot vacuums or autonomous vehicles that need to con-
tinuously monitor their surroundings and respond reflexively in order to function (Elliott, 
2019). Admittedly, intelligent technologies used in organizations or in households are not 
quite yet at a stage where they can monitor their own performance and adapt future actions 
based on past performance, but they are certainly at the stage where they can monitor their 
own actions by engaging in a flow of context-responsive behavior. However, as these exam-
ples show, intelligent technologies in their current form still rely on human interventions 
and implementations to fully utilize their own knowledgeability and reflexive monitoring.
Control and Structure
To address the relationship between human agency and machine agency, it is important to 
recognize that ST conceptualizes power as relational as does Foucault (1979). According 
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to Giddens (1984), power can be seen as a dialectic of control in which subordinate social 
actors can influence the choices and behaviors of their supervisors and create transforma-
tive outcomes by drawing on resources that they control and have access to, namely struc-
ture. In other words, structure enables knowledgeable and reflexive agents to exert power 
and control. Not surprisingly, control systems also play an important role in structuring 
and holding organizational units together by providing rules by which to direct work tasks, 
evaluate work, and reward and discipline workers (Edwards, 1981). The organizational 
communication literature has identified various forms of control that arise in organiza-
tions, ranging from more direct, top-down approaches used in hierarchical organizational 
structures to more indirect, peer-based, or internalized forms of concertive or unobtrusive 
control (Tompkins & Cheney, 1985).
The discussion around issues of control between humans and machines is not new but 
is rooted in discussions of the ways in which earlier forms of technology were implicated 
in the negotiation of organizational control. For instance, Levy (2015) found that electronic 
monitoring systems exerted new forms of control over workers in the trucking industry, 
by providing new metrics for evaluating truckers’ job performance and challenging their 
accounts of local and biophysical conditions, and that truckers engaged in resistance prac-
tices to subvert or circumvent these control mechanisms. Cybernetic scholars have also 
centered their theorizing about communication around issues of information and control 
(Guzman, 2016). As Wiener (1950) pointed out, “the significance of machines in human 
society” is reflected in their relationships to communication and control (p. 23). The shift 
from technology as a tool or object of use to automated machines that manage human 
actions is a reflection of the political and power struggles between workers and manag-
ers (Guzman, 2016; Noble, 2011). With intelligent technologies, control can be even more 
adaptive. As our discussion of Uber would suggest, intelligent technologies such as AI may 
exert even more control through the capacity to self-correct through the use of sophisti-
cated sensors and delicate feedback systems (Chan & Humphreys, 2018; Guzman, 2016). 
More importantly, the increasing amount of agency and capacity for interactivity also opens 
the door for peer or collaborative relationships in human-machine interactions that goes 
beyond the question of who has control (Janlert & Stolterman, 2017; Sundar et al., 2016).
HMC literature also acknowledges the relational nature of the negotiation of control 
between humans and intelligent technologies. Malone (2018) pointed out that AI in orga-
nizational use could play differing roles and these roles range in terms of the amount of 
control given to AI, from low to high. For instance, intelligent technologies can not only act 
as an assistant when they function with some degree of human input (i.e., use voice com-
mand to instruct Google Home), but can also act as a peer if a digital assistant (e.g., chatbot) 
interacts with other humans on behalf of an individual (Moore, 2019). More importantly, 
intelligent technologies can serve in a variety of roles depending on the context and use. 
In other words, these roles range on a control continuum and are not static. Rather, they 
fluctuate depending on the experience of individuals. An example of how AI’s role shifts 
based on the eye of the beholder is autonomous vehicles (Malone, 2018). A self-driving 
car may be viewed as a tool to its human passengers, as it is being used to transport them 
from one point to another. That same self-driving car, however, could be viewed as a peer 
by other drivers that share the road with the vehicle. Similarly, an AI project management 
system that manages the workflow of organizational teams could be viewed as having a 
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managerial role in their organization by its subordinates but be seen as a peer or even assis-
tant by human managers. Thus, similar to ST, control in HMC is dependent on the agency 
of machines in relation to a group of individuals who also have varying degrees of agency.
Structure can take many forms in HMC. According to Giddens (1984), the duality of 
structure can take three forms: domination, signification, and legitimation. Domination 
refers to the unequal distribution of power resources, which may be available to some 
agents (e.g., managers) and not others (e.g., lower-level employees) (McPhee et al., 2014). 
For example, in cases where companies appoint AI agents to play an official organizational 
role, intelligent technologies have authoritative power (over people) or allocative power 
(over resources) as they make decisions for organizations, recommend strategies to man-
agers and workers, or provide work assignments to employees (Chan & Humphreys, 2018; 
Diktonius, 2016; IBM Watson Talent, 2021). Similarly, the ways organizational members 
interpret the role that intelligent technologies play (Malone, 2018) or how society views AI 
ontologically (Guzman, 2020) can also provide structures for signification, the interpreted 
meaning through lived experience in context of the structure, or legitimation, expectations 
and norms that can influence the consequences of actions (Giddens, 1984).
Algorithmic control and rendition as mechanisms of structuration. We propose that struc-
turation in HMC takes place through algorithmic control and the process of rendition. 
Algorithmic control is a form of technical control that is prevalent on labor platforms in 
the gig economy (i.e., ride sharing and the food delivery industry). Companies can use 
algorithms to shape and influence the behavior and outcomes of workers (Wood et al., 
2019). Through the process of rendition (also known as datafication and mediatization; 
Chan & Humphreys, 2018), human action is encoded into organizational or algorithmic 
data (Zuboff, 2019), which in turn constitute structures that enable and constrain employee 
behavior and outcomes. For instance, Wood et al. argue that organizations using algorith-
mic management in the form of platform-based rating or recommendation systems exert 
a form of Taylorist informational control on their employees and that computerization 
intensifies work by increasing monitoring, increasing the pace, and extending work activity 
beyond the conventional workday. 
The hallmark of algorithmic systems is their ability to record and aggregate behavioral 
information and statistics from a variety of internal and external sources (Kellogg et al., 
2020). Algorithms take on agency and are able to serve a managerial role in organizations 
in part due to advancements in deep machine learning through neural networks. In deep 
machine learning, computers use Bayesian statistical models to recognize patterns in large 
amounts of labeled data (often referred to as “tagged data”) (Krizhevsky et al., 2012). Deep 
machine learning follows the computer science adage, “garbage in, garbage out” which indi-
cates that human agency (in the form of the quality of the data labeling) will directly impact 
the machine’s ability to learn from the data (Biggio & Roli, 2018; Krizhevsky et al., 2012). 
The algorithms behind Uber’s customer rating system exert influence over the behavior and 
work outcomes of Uber drivers, who can be automatically fired for dropping below a cer-
tain average rating—motivating them to perform emotional labor and engage in strategic 
behavior to increase their customer ratings (Chan & Humphreys, 2018; Rosenblat & Stark, 
2016). Even without formal power structures (structures of domination), Uber drivers may 
still see the behind-the-scenes algorithm as an AI manager (structures of signification). In 
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other words, algorithmic control through rendition is reflective of a structurational pro-
cess of HMC. As a structurational process, human managers are utilizing machine agency 
that uses data collected from human actors to minimize workers’ intervention and auto-
matically generate data, assess worker behavior, and assign work tasks (Newlands, 2020). 
Machine agency in turn enables and constrains the decision-making and other behavior of 
workers and organizations.
The duality of structure is one of the fundamental sensitizing devices in the structura-
tional approach (Giddens 1979; 1984). Machine learning processes enable algorithmic man-
agement to reflect this duality of structure as they blur the lines between human agency and 
organizational structures. Orlikowski (1992) argued that there is a duality of technology, or 
an inherently interdependent relationship between objective technological properties and 
the interpretive flexibility that facilitates social construction of technology use. Orlikowski 
(1992) recognized that technology is a product of human action because humans create 
and adapt the technology; however, in rendition agency and structure are even more insep-
arable, as user behavior actually forms the basis of the technology. Rendition also allows 
algorithmic managers to adapt in real-time based on changes in user behavior. 
Negotiating Agency and Control: Toward a Research Agenda
Despite the growing use of intelligent technologies in organizations, HMC scholarship has 
focused primarily on explaining human-machine communication at the individual level, 
without consideration of organizational dynamics and control mechanisms. Intelligent 
technologies differ from prior organizational technologies in that they have the potential to 
reposition our conceptualization of technology as object to one of technology as agent. While 
the notion of computers as social agents is not new and stems from the CASA paradigm 
(Reeves & Nass, 1996), CASA is more focused on explaining individual interactions with 
AI, rather than group and organizational level processes. Our structurational framework 
constitutes an important first step in conceptualizing the role agency and control play in 
understanding the processes of HMC in organizational context.
A key feature of the HMC structuration process is that it is dialectical, as organizational 
actors are constantly bound between the negotiations between human and machine agency 
as well as between traditional organizational control and algorithmic control. Therefore, 
we draw on the notion of dialectics in ST to conceptualize what this process might look 
like in organizational use of intelligent technologies. Giddens (1979) was one of the first 
scholars to conceptualize dialectics in social structures, which arise when the operation of 
one structural principle presupposes another that tends to undermine it (Giddens, 1984). 
According to Giddens (1979), dialectics or contradictions arise “in the midst of, and as a 
result of, the structuration of modes of system representation” (p. 141). Giddens defined the 
dialectic of control as a reciprocal power relationship between active agents and institutional 
forms of control. According to Giddens, the dialectic of control is usually constituted by 
conflicts around autonomy and dependence among social actors (e.g., between employees 
and organizations). Howard and Geist (1995) illustrated the dialectic of control in their 
case study on the ideological positioning of employees at a gas company in the context 
of a proposed merger with another company. They identified three dialectics or opposi-
tions, between change and stability, empowerment and powerlessness, and identification 
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and estrangement. Howard and Geist explained that SGC employees took either passive or 
active ideological positions to help them navigate the tensions with the merger. We extend 
the dialectic of control to examine the negotiation of power relationships between human 
agents and intelligent technology agents. While the dialectic of control has traditionally 
focused on tensions between organizational control and employee resistance, AI brings a 
new form of control into the mix: algorithmic control. With this structurational view in 
mind, we now turn to some illustrative examples in organizations to show both theoreti-
cally and practically how humans and machines negotiate this dialectic of control. 
Illustrative Examples
According to Zuboff (2019), the surveillance capitalist system is characterized by tech-
nologies that accurately predict and control human behavior, and this makes the agency 
afforded by these technologies less prominent, hidden, or blurred. For example, car insur-
ance premium rates are determined by a myriad of factors that do not seem to connect to 
driving, such as an individual’s likelihood of shopping around for competitive prices based 
on purchasing history (O’Neil, 2016). Often, these algorithms are so complex that very few 
people—not even the insurance agents themselves—understand how the algorithm arrives 
at the premium numbers. Another example is Amazon’s “Ambots,” the nickname given to 
Amazon warehouse employees who are reviewed on the time it takes them to pick and 
pack items for shipment (Faraj et al., 2018). Managed by algorithms, employees are tracked 
in the warehouse and assigned to pick items based on the most efficient route. Employees 
are rewarded for improving their times or punished for having slower times. We now go 
into further detail on three examples to illustrate our structurational view of HMC. Each of 
the examples we will use—A/B testing, humans in the loop, and automated journalism—
represent uses of intelligent technologies that are becoming more prevalent in organiza-
tions. They each reflect a dialectic of control in terms of the negotiation of human-machine 
agency and control. 
A/B testing. One example that illustrates our structurational perspective is A/B testing. 
This is an example of information asymmetries in AI systems (Rosenblat, 2019), which are 
defined as situations “in which one party knows more than the other” (Sundararajan, 2016, 
p. 139). In A/B testing, software designers create different versions of platforms in order 
to understand how differences in features impact user behavior. A/B trials can range from 
minor discrepancies to entirely different ecosystems for users. Rosenblat explained that in 
the rideshare context of Uber, different types of A/B testing may include paying one group 
of employees more than another, offering different types of bonuses for giving a certain 
number of rides, and even different visual displays that may or may not shape work behav-
iors. Often, users do not know they are a part of A/B trials as their knowledge might impact 
research that developers are conducting. A/B testing enables companies to conduct more 
rigorous rendition, since it allows machine learning systems to observe and learn from a 
variety of user behavior in response to changing stimuli. In this case, machine agency is 
comprised mainly of reflexive monitoring, whereas the agency of users takes the form of 
practical consciousness as they go about their habituated work routines without awareness 
of how platforms are shaping their work behaviors. 
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The changing nature of AI systems in A/B testing has important implications for struc-
turational approaches to technology. One implication is that the structural rules of the 
technology have the potential to change from user to user; this means that there might be 
tensions between knowledgeability in machine and human actors. In the rideshare exam-
ple, machines have more knowledge about which workers are funneled into different eco-
systems, while rideshare workers may be completely unaware that there are discrepancies. 
The dialectic of control plays out as different features (e.g., visual displays) impact user 
behavior, which in turn provides data and inputs that inform, optimize, and transform the 
system. 
Humans in the loop. A second example is humans in the loop (HIL), a phrase that describes 
the partnership of humans and computers (intelligent algorithms) working together on 
tasks to achieve the highest level of performance and efficiency (Malone, 2018). Despite the 
common narrative that machines will destroy jobs, the reality is that intelligent technolo-
gies can only provide a replacement for certain tasks within job roles. Companies rely on 
humans to perform tasks that AI cannot do or that would be inefficient or costly to develop 
an algorithmic system to do. Malone argued that rather than regarding intelligent technolo-
gies as replacements for humans, we should consider them as complements to human capa-
bilities and vice versa. Workers becoming HIL will experience changes in processes and 
redesigning of tasks, which could be sites of struggle as the balance of control and agency 
becomes less equal (Brynjolfsson et al., 2018).
The collaboration process between humans and machines, also called heteromation 
(Ekbia & Nardi, 2014), may vary in terms of the distribution of control and agency between 
humans and computers as manifested in both task distributions and the visibility of the 
respective agent. Collaborations involving low algorithmic control (compared to humans) 
include knowledge-sharing platforms such as Wikipedia, which combines human knowl-
edge and creativity with the capabilities of the internet and data storage platform technol-
ogy to build the largest encyclopedia the world has ever seen (Malone, 2018). 
On the opposite end of the spectrum, collaborations involving high algorithmic con-
trol include the phenomenon known as “ghost work” (Gray & Suri, 2019). In ghost work, 
humans perform tasks that an algorithm is unable to do, including cleaning and organizing 
unstructured data, verifying locations and identities, and creating content. In other words, 
rather than technology being a complement to the human, the human is the augment to 
the technology. Tasks done by ghost workers are typically repetitive and simple, for exam-
ple, training a facial recognition algorithm to recognize a particular image by answering 
“yes” or “no” to whether two provided pictures are the same person (Kellogg et al., 2020). 
In ghost work, machine learning algorithms take on high levels of agency and algorithmic 
control and humans seem to disappear. For example, Microsoft’s Face API uses ghost work-
ers to increase the accuracy of identity detection for Uber’s Real-time ID Check (Gray & 
Suri, 2019). Uber drivers are randomly selected to provide a selfie for identity verification, 
and if the algorithm is unable to determine whether the profile and selfie images match, 
the images are sent to a ghost worker who has approximately 30 seconds to compare the 
pictures and decide whether they are a match or not. This human worker is critical to the 
system for providing training to the algorithm, safety to the Uber passenger, and continued 
income for the driver. This human, however, remains nameless and is only alluded to in 
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passing in Uber’s description of the verification process; the human gets placed into the 
technological black box. It is important to note that even in such cases where algorithms 
seem to have most of the control, humans play an important (albeit invisible) role in per-
forming tasks designed to correct and teach the machine. This suggests that despite the 
increased potential for algorithmic agency and control in organizations, humans will still 
maintain control over tasks where the algorithm falls short. This reflects Giddens’s (1984) 
notion that even workers in low power positions can exert agency.
Automated journalism. A third example in which algorithms are impacting agency and 
structural norms is automated (or algorithmic) journalism. Public scrutiny about journal-
istic integrity, political bias, and elitism has fueled the proliferation of algorithms in this 
field as they are viewed as being less biased than their human counterparts (Graefe et al., 
2018). Rather than having news content selected by editors and feedback mainly consist-
ing of paper or magazine sales, real-time analytics provide journalists and outlets instant 
feedback on readership and actions such as link sharing through social media. Journalists 
are now accountable to their readers more than their editors, and content is driven by what 
authors think will get the most attention (Christin, 2017). In the new field of automated 
journalism, news outlets such as the Associated Press are utilizing “robot authors” to create 
content faster and in a less costly manner than human reporters (Graefe et al., 2018). This 
increased use of algorithms has prompted discussions within the field on redefining previ-
ously held understanding of what it means to be an author and a journalist, as well as larger 
discussions on what journalism is and how the field should operate (Carlson, 2015). The 
phenomenon of automated journalism can be reinterpreted through a structurational lens. 
For instance, a study of the code and algorithms contained in mobile news apps challenges 
the common notion that algorithms are replacing humans as producers of news, by high-
lighting the role of code in helping journalists order and communicate the news (Weber & 
Kosterich, 2018). This study illustrates the dialectic of control between human and machine 
agency, as human actors imbue decisions and agency into the code such that it takes on 
agency of its own and begins to occupy an editorial role, prioritizing and sorting news based 
on the human input it receives.  
Future Research Agenda and Conclusion
Viewing HMC through a structurational framework helps to advance HMC scholarship. 
First, it helps to explain the recursive relationship between human and machine agency 
and the process through which they are mutually constituted in organizations. This struc-
turational process occurs as human agency creates the behavior that constitutes the knowl-
edgeability (or intelligence) of machine agency. Machines then learn by surveilling human 
actions, and when algorithmic systems have high predictive value, they can in turn limit 
human agency without people being aware of it. The process of rendition also makes it diffi-
cult for humans to oversee how machines are learning, which means increased potential for 
exacerbating existing biases. Second, a structurational framework provides an important 
counterpoint to scholarship on algorithmic control, which has emphasized its constraining 
structural elements (e.g., Newlands, 2020; Wood et al., 2019; Zuboff, 2019) by bringing in 
agency (as an interplay between human and machine agency). This highlights the fact that, 
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while agentic, algorithmic systems are not a form of “autonomous technology” (Sturken et 
al., 2004) that exists outside of human control. Rather, they are continually produced and 
reproduced through human action. While they may have unintended consequences, they 
are continually evolving in a recursive relationship with the human actors that interact with 
them and provide them with inputs. 
Viewing these changes through a structurational lens enables scholars to provide a 
broader picture not only for fellow researchers, but for practitioners as intelligent technol-
ogies impact work teams and shape organizational cultures. For example, increasing use of 
these technologies can affect learning and reshape what is considered expertise, which in 
turn can have a ripple effect as newer employees are onboarded and tensions between older 
and newer practices arise. In some cases, employees would resort to deviant methods to 
learn skills after the implementation of a new technology, called “shadow learning” (Beane, 
2019). Additionally, intelligent technologies with more control over decision-making, such 
as intelligent personal assistants or even intelligent project managers, can interrupt team 
learning and knowledge sharing which can then impact overall team performance (Yan et 
al., 2020). 
There are several avenues that future research on this topic should consider. First, there 
may be additional dimensions besides control and agency that impact the role of AI in 
collaborative practices. For instance, the degree of visibility and embodiment of intelligent 
technologies may influence the role they can play and the level of control they have. Future 
research should also consider how issues of control and agency may vary across differ-
ent types of work and occupational cultures. For instance, higher skilled professionals that 
have deeply engrained tacit knowledge, domain-specific training, and professional hierar-
chies such as lawyers may have more difficulty working alongside intelligent technologies. 
Certain occupational practices, such as attorney-client privilege and liability, may result in 
certain organizational members being more resistant to using AI due to privacy or ethical 
concerns, concerns about its judgment, or concerns about its accuracy. There may also be 
different occupational cultures around blue-collar/manufacturing work versus white-collar 
information or knowledge work that shape perceptions and usage of intelligent technol-
ogies. These cultural differences may shape dominant discourses around automation and 
job security, concerns or fears about loss of control, and resistance to technology. Applying 
our structurational perspective to study occupational culture, for example, would involve 
immersive observation or interviews to learn about the particular occupational context and 
how institutional logics associated with it shape how intelligent technologies are used and 
perceived. It would also be best served through a longitudinal design to allow for observa-
tion of recursive relationship between human and machine agency and the ways in which 
they interact and shape one another over time. 
Our structurational framework suggests new research questions to inform the HMC 
research agenda going forward. What will happen as intelligent technologies develop more 
knowledgeability and reflexive monitoring? How do organizations work with AI that can 
take on fully agentic roles? How can we understand new relationships between agency and 
structure in the rendition process? How do workers communicatively resist algorithmic 
control? One example of this is adversarial machine learning, in which humans intention-
ally provide inputs to subvert rather than improve the accuracy of AI systems (e.g., by trick-
ing facial recognition systems to recognize a turtle as a rifle) (Biggio & Roli, 2018). Finally, 
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does algorithmic management inevitably represent a return to Taylorist control, or can it be 
restructured to provide more worker empowerment? 
In conclusion, as intelligent technologies become more ubiquitous in organizations, 
it is important to understand how these new organizational agents will affect processes of 
organizing. Our structurational framework helps to theorize the process by which human 
and machine agency is mutually constituted and negotiated in a dialectic of control. One 
consequence of this imbrication of human and machine agency is that machines are start-
ing to act more human at the same time as humans are starting to act more like machines. 
We encourage researchers to find novel ways to apply our structurational framework to help 
guide our understanding of AI and its role in organizing processes.
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